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Abstract
Purpose – We explore the short-term humanitarian response to a natural disaster that prompts a rapid
influx of relief supplies to the area affected by the disaster, aiming to understand the dynamics of
systemic processes that apply to humanitarian supply chain logistics.
Design/methodology/approach – We use system dynamics to simulate the disaster relief supply chain
elements of humanitarian response. System dynamics is a well-established simulation method for
analyzing complex social systems that include feedback. We used it because the timing and coordination
of, and feedback loops among, events in humanitarian response incorporate a delay structure that can
be modeled effectively using system dynamics.
Findings – Of all the stocks in our model of the Humanitarian Stock Management System, the most
important was the Cumulative Food distributed to disaster victims. In all of our simulation runs, victims
eventually got all the food they needed, but at varying speeds (fast in the base run, slow in runs where
repair of infrastructure was slow). However, the most problematic stock was the amount of Food in the
Central Warehouse. In almost all the runs, that stock contained an excess of food (which is very
common in such situations), resulting in waste and inefficiency. This problem was worst when the
agency panicked at the outset and doubled its estimate of needed food, and when, as is often true, the
agency received too many in-kind donations of food. The most interesting finding was that “managing”
donations led to the best overall performance--low waste, good relief for victims.
Practical implications – We offer a number of policy recommendations, including the need to avoid
early bias, to repair infrastructure as quickly as possible, to develop better methods for keeping track of
inventories and supplies on the way, and striking a balance between encouraging and dampening
donations.
Originality/value – This study focuses on understanding the short-term dynamics of the logistics of a
humanitarian response, using a system dynamics approach. There have been only two other studies
applying system dynamics to humanitarian assistance. One was operational and focused on long-term
dynamics (often called “development,” as opposed to “response”) and the other was abstract and
focused on those same longer-term dynamics. While these studies have produced meaningful insight,
our study is unique in that we have applied an operational approach to a short, or “crisis response,”
time horizon.
Keywords: Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Logistics, Humanitarian Supply Chain, System Dynamics,
Modeling, Disaster Response
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1. Introduction
1.1 Humanitarian Aid
The international humanitarian community and humanitarian aid groups have increased
attention to disaster response in recent years. With the increase in humanitarian response, the need to
understand the coordination of aid groups and the quality of response logistics is greater than ever. A
recent report, The State of the Humanitarian System (Taylor, et al., 2012), gives insight about the
workings of the humanitarian system as a whole. The report comments on everything from financial
status and aid effectiveness to aid worker safety and needs assessment methodology. The report notes
that aid organizations have increased response to natural disasters in the past decade due in part to the
increase in the number of natural disasters. Between 2009 and 2010, aid organizations responded to
103 disasters. This figure marks a 10 per cent increase from the previous two years. Additionally, the
number of international aid workers responding worldwide increased four percent between 2009 and
2010 (Taylor, et al., 2012).
There has been overall growth of the humanitarian system and a corresponding increase in
humanitarian actors participating in response. Consequently, the systematic coordination and
evaluation of operations have proved difficult and have proven to be areas in constant need of
improvement. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports
nearly 2,000 agencies operating in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (OCHA, 2010). OCHA also
notes that the global humanitarian community had pledged in excess of $3.5 billion within one year of
the Haiti earthquake.
Despite this tremendous effort to respond to the need in Haiti, leaders at OCHA describe a
humanitarian response system in disarray and a response effort that some called just short of a failure
(Altay, 2014). Logistical complications associated with the massive influx of relief goods arriving by
plane, and the need to divert deliveries of relief agencies, is one noted pitfall during the early stages of
the response (Holguin-Veras, 2012). The situation in Haiti demonstrates why having a systemic
understanding of humanitarian operations during the early stages of response is critical for a successful
response.

1.2 Humanitarian Needs Assessment
OCHA has developed the Multi-Cluster Rapid Needs Assessment (MIRA) method. The MIRA
approach is a universal method for needs assessment of disaster/crisis affected areas. The process
begins with preparation, initial assessment, and continued assessment until the humanitarian aid actors
exit the area. The ongoing process of the needs assessment is a best attempt at coping with uncertain
demand in disaster situations. However, delays in timing inevitably lead to oversupply of some goods
and under supply of others. There have even been reports of tons of inappropriate goods supplied as
part of humanitarian efforts responding to populations in need (Altay, 2008).
In the case of a sudden onset disaster, need is immediate. The MIRA approach attempts initial
assessment within 48 hours of the event, but further needs assessment is an iterative process that may
continue for years after a disaster. In the initial period, the onslaught of media coverage often sparks an
urge for response by the humanitarian and private sectors. Humanitarian actors want to respond
accurately and as quickly as possible, to direct the incoming supplies to meet the need of affected
populations. In addition to the unpredictable demands of disaster situations, an unexpected supply of

3

unsolicited donations often adds to the chaos of response and makes meeting the accuracy goal very
difficult.

1.3 Humanitarian Logistics
The many difficulties of matching the indefinite demand of disaster-affected areas with the
cacophony of aid groups and unsolicited supply have led logistics to become a very important topic in
humanitarian work. In September 2005, the UN Emergency Response Coordinator introduced a three
pillar agenda for reform of the humanitarian system to improve coordination and collaboration (OCHA,
2015). This reform organized the humanitarian system into clusters and cluster leads:
Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations (UN and non-UN) working in the main
sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. shelter and health. They are created when clear
humanitarian needs exist within a sector, when there are numerous actors within
sectors and when national authorities need coordination support. Clusters provide a
clear point of contact and are accountable for adequate and appropriate humanitarian
assistance. Clusters create partnerships between international humanitarian actors,
national and local authorities, and civil society. (OCHA, 2015)
The World Food Programme (WFP) is the current cluster lead for the food and logistics clusters.
The 2012 WFP response to super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines demonstrates the immediate need
and rapid distribution of goods that calls for accurate understanding of logistics. Within 24 hours of the
typhoon, the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) had dispatched goods from two
hubs on behalf of WFP and other partners. In the two months following the disaster, UNHRD
consolidated and dispatched 1,500 metric tons of goods, valued at over US$ 8.2 million, on behalf of 24
partners.

1.4 The Systemic Nature of Humanitarian Logistics
The magnitude of a disaster relief response, and the number of humanitarian actors involved,
suggests that the logistics of humanitarian response has a systemic nature and must work with
systematic tools to better understand appropriate solutions. The coordination of humanitarian logistics
includes a series of timing and delays that create a complex social system that lends itself well to system
dynamics modeling. System dynamics is a well-established simulation method for analyzing complex
social systems and has been used successfully in modeling humanitarian operations (Goncalves 2008;
Besiou and Van Wassenhove, 2011). However, there is no current system dynamics model that captures
the short-term humanitarian response from an operational point of view. In this study, we provide this
model and aim to construct recommendations from the resulting insights.

1.5 Study Overview
We present the literature review in Section 2, which introduces past research related to
humanitarian work in disaster response and system dynamics modeling in humanitarian work. In
Section 3, we provide the objective and approach used in this study, including reference modes, a causal
loop diagram showing our dynamic hypothesis, and the system dynamics model used in this study. In
Section 4, we define and discuss modeling assumptions and inputs. In Section 5, we present the
modeling scenarios and simulation results. We discuss our conclusions and recommendations in Section
6.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Humanitarian Logistics
Kovacs and Spens (2007) present a thorough review of the literature available on humanitarian
logistics in disaster relief operations. They focus on exploring and describing the unique characteristics
of humanitarian logistics in disaster relief and draw parallels between humanitarian logistics and
business logistics. The authors identify two main areas of humanitarian logistics: continuous aid work
and disaster relief. The authors note that the general phases of disaster relief operations include
preparation, immediate response, and reconstruction. During the preparation phase, responding
agencies can take critical measures to limit the effects of disasters; however, many donors want their
contributions go directly to help victims, which shortchanges preparation operations and, as we shall
see, overemphasizes response operations. Kovacs and Spens’s (2007) review of the humanitarian
logistics literature concludes that the main problem in the immediate response phase of disaster relief
operations is rooted in coordination of supply with the unpredictability of demand and the resultant
difficulties of transporting relief items to disaster victims.

2.2 Humanitarian Supply Chain
Cozzolino (2012) provides a detailed review of the current state of knowledge on humanitarian
logistics. One chapter focuses on humanitarian logistics and supply chain management. The author
notes that, despite some disagreement in the literature, disaster management includes the stages of
mitigation, preparation, response and reconstruction. The author mentions that coordination and
collaboration among all actors involved in the humanitarian response deserve attention and study.
Achieving efficient operations during the first days and weeks after a disaster is critical and
understanding the humanitarian supply chain is the key to the needed efficiency. Cozzolino explains
that effectiveness in the short term ensures saving time and lives within the disaster affected
populations, while efficiency in the long term ensures saving costs and helps in rebuilding more
livelihoods. Her call to understand effective supply chain operations in the short term is one focus of
the present paper.

2.3 Issues in Humanitarian Logistics
The many complexities involved with humanitarian operations during disaster relief lead to a
number of logistical challenges that scholars have identified and defined well in the literature (Altay
2008, Goncalves 2008). A full review of the many logistical challenges faced by managers of
humanitarian operations is beyond the scope of this study; however, the most relevant are as follows:
●
●
●
●

Disasters yield poor and unpredictable operating conditions. Disabled infrastructure, such as
supply ports and roads, slows relief operations.
Structured logistics processes are often not available because of damaged or inadequate
information and communication systems.
Limited resources and inappropriately assessed needs often drive the relief effort and supply
chain.
Unsolicited donations can overwhelm and bottleneck the supply chain and disrupt the
appropriate allocation of resources.

We include all of these challenges in our model.

5

2.4 System Dynamics in Humanitarian Logistics
Two studies to date have incorporated system dynamics modeling to understand humanitarian
operations (Goncalves 2008; Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2011). Goncalves (2008) notes the many
challenges faced by humanitarian organizations and suggests that we need tools to help understand the
complex systems, in terms of the structures and policies that regulate performance, within which the
organizations operate. He goes on to note that system dynamics can be such a tool, and can help
managers learn in the complex setting of humanitarian operations. His study uses a system dynamics
model to show that overemphasis on short-term relief efforts can hamper capacity building of the
organization, which then hampers its longer-term ability to respond to disasters. His view of the longerterm makes his model is somewhat less operational (Richmond, 1993), i.e. too abstract, than a model
focused on short-term disaster relief. Nevertheless, Goncalves’s (2008) study is a good example of how
to use system dynamics to create stylized simulations and help decision makers to understand the longterm effects of policy decisions better, and to explore new strategy.
A study by Besiou and Van Wassenhove (2011) analyzes a well-defined subsystem of
humanitarian operations using system dynamics to simulate field-vehicle fleet management. Their
study is more operational (it focuses on truck fleets), but still examines long-term decision making, that
is, continuous aid work, as opposed to disaster response. However, Besiou and Van Wassenhove (2011)
state that beyond their example of vehicle management, additional areas of humanitarian operations
would be well suited to research using system dynamics. Besiou and Van Wassenhove (2011) conclude
by noting that system dynamics has the ability to represent accurately the complexities of humanitarian
operations, and they give their support to the system dynamics approach as an appropriate tool
studying humanitarian systems.
By contrast to these two previous works, the present research applies system dynamics to shortterm, operational, disaster-response phenomena in humanitarian operations. Thus, we add to the
existing literature, which includes no system dynamics models that capture the short-term humanitarian
response from an operational point of view. In this study, we provide such a model and aim to construct
recommendations from the insights gained.

3. Objective and Approach
3.1 Problem Definition
Section 2.3 listed the many issues that arise during disaster response:
●
●
●
●

Disasters yield poor and unpredictable operating conditions. Disabled infrastructure, such as
supply ports and roads, slows relief operations.
Structured logistics processes are often not available because of damaged or inadequate
information and communication systems.
Limited resources and inappropriately assessed needs often drive the relief effort and supply
chain.
Unsolicited donations can overwhelm and bottleneck the supply chain and disrupt the
appropriate allocation of resources.

The aim of the present paper is to include these elements in a system dynamics model, to simulate
various policies for dealing with them, and to make recommendations based on the results.
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3.2

Reference Modes

To help understand the problem, system dynamics typically uses graphs of the behavior over
time of relevant variables. Modelers call these “reference modes” because they refer to them as checks
on model outputs. The reference modes demonstrate behavior of a model input over time.
We have chosen to focus on food, which is one of the most important supplies needed after a
disaster. Aggregating World Food Programme data from three disasters (the Haiti earthquake of 2010,
the Philippines typhoon of 2013, and the Afghanistan floods of 2014), Figure 1 shows that the delivery of
food rises rapidly in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but levels off after 150 days or so.

3.3 Dynamic Hypothesis
We assert that the delivery of
humanitarian food supplies is a special
case of the familiar Stock Management
Structure from system dynamics
(Sterman, 2000, chapter 17). We show
the generic structure in Figure 2.

Figure 1. Reference Mode for World Food Programme Food Delivery After
Disasters

In the Stock Management
Structure, a decision maker needs to
maintain the level of a stock S (in our
case, food in a central humanitarian
warehouse) by replenishing the stocks
units as the decision maker delivers
them, but at the same time keeping in
mind previously ordered units in the
pipeline. One key to the Stock
Management Structure is its many
delays--of physical flows and of
perceptions.
We show our dynamic
hypothesis in a causal loop diagram in
Figure 3. Figure 3 shows five loops, all
balancing, along with some specific
features of humanitarian response that
differ from the generic Stock

Figure 2. Generic Stock Management Structure

Management Structure.
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Figure 3. Dynamic Hypothesis

●

●

●
●
●

Loop B1, “Distribution to victims,” shows the central activity in humanitarian response-distribution of food aid to disaster victims. Increases in Food in the Central Warehouse increase
the Distribution Rate, which increases Food Distributed to Victims, which in turn reduces the
amount of Food in the Central Warehouse.
Loop B2, “Saturation,” shows how food distribution slows down as the agency meets the needs
of the disaster-stricken population. Increases in Food Distributed to Victims reduce the size of
the Victim Food Gap, which reduces the Distribution Rate and, in turn, reduces the Food
Distributed to Victims. This loop creates the reference mode—the amount of food the agency
distributes levels off and ends as the disaster-stricken population gets all the food it needs.
Loop B3, “Replenish after distribution,” is the first part of the Stock Management System. As
food moves out of the Central Warehouse, the agency orders replacement food.
Loop B4, “Adjust for supply line,” modifies the amount of food ordered based on what the
agency knows is in the pipeline.
Loop B5, “Donation,” is where donors add food to the pipeline as they react to the need for
food. As the Gap in the Central Warehouse Food increases, Donations increase (after a delay).
This increases Food in the Supply Line, which increases Food Delivery and Food in the Central
Warehouse, closing the Gap.

We do not show it in Figure 3, but a well-known feature of the Stock Management Structure is
knowledge of what is in the warehouse and knowledge of what is in the supply line. These relate to
Loops B3 and B4; the chaos of the aftermath of disasters often reduces knowledge of existing or ordered
food stocks, and makes these two variables relevant to this research. We include them in the full model.
Figure 3 shows three exogenous features peculiar to the humanitarian response version of the
Stock Management Structure:
●

●

Road Infrastructure Quality. Prior to a disaster, the road infrastructure in an affected
country is adequate to ensure both delivery and distribution of food. After a disaster,
poor road conditions slow down both of these flows.
Port Infrastructure Quality. Prior to a disaster, the port infrastructure in an affected
country is adequate to ensure both delivery and distribution of food. After a disaster,
poor port conditions slow down both of these flows.
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●

Bias for High Food Stock. The shock of a disaster may cause responders to overestimate
the need for higher levels of food in the system.

3.4 Stock and Flow Model
Figure 4 shows the stock management structure of the full system dynamics model. Its
foundation is the generic stock management structure.

Figure 4. The Full Model of Humanitarian Food Delivery

Boldface items highlighted in gray are the features peculiar to the humanitarian disaster response
context:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Effect of Road Infrastructure Quality (see Figure 5)
Effect of Port Infrastructure Quality (except for different variable names, the structure is the
same as what we show in Figure 5)
Effect of Relative Food (Figure 6)
Effect of Donation (Figure 7)
Effect of Bias for High Food Stock
Knowledge of Food in Central Warehouse
Knowledge of Food in Supply Line

We address the first four items using table functions. After a disaster, the ratio of actual infrastructure
(either ports or roads) to desired infrastructure drops, so we use an upward-sloping function to reduce
the flow of food in the early days, as infrastructure damage is high, while raising the flow as the region
repairs its infrastructure. To control the distribution of food as the population gets what it needs, we
use a downward-sloping table function that gradually shuts off the flow of food as the ratio of actual to
needed approaches one. We formulate the donation sector by using a mildly upward-sloping table
function (Figure 8) that reacts to the “Pressure to Donate” created by the ratio of what donors would
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normally like to see in the Central Warehouse and what is suddenly needed after a disaster. We address
bias and logistical knowledge with parameters.

Figure 6. Food View

Figure 5. Infrastructure View

Figure 7. Donation View

Figure 8. Donation Table Function
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4. Model Assumptions and Inputs
4.1 Model Parameters
Table 1 shows the parameters (and their units) that we used in the eight simulation runs we
discuss in section 5.1. Each run has a 150-day time horizon.

4.2 Model Assumptions
Here are the highlights of the assumptions we made:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

We assume a population of 2 million people in the affected area.
Each person requires an average of 0.02 metric tons of food, cumulatively, over the 150-day
period (approximately 0.25 pounds of food per person per day).
Each of the adjustments and delivery times in the food stock management system has an
associated delay, as we show in Table 1.
Damage from the disaster happens in a one-day pulse.
It takes 3 days for the disaster response agencies to assess the level of need for food.
Port and road infrastructures sustain 75% damage from the disaster.
It takes 30 days to repair the port infrastructure, and 60 days to repair road infrastructure.
Once the disaster strikes, donors give 1000 metric tons of food per day to disaster response
agencies.
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5. Model Results
5.1 Results of Simulation Runs
The equilibrium run shows all outputs flat.
We do not show it here because we expect this result,
given that in the base scenario there has been no
disaster and no donation. By contrast, the “base” run
has a disaster and its concomitant need for more food
in the central warehouse, road and port infrastructure
damage and repair, and donation spurred by the
disaster. Figure 9 shows the results for the three
major stocks--Food in the Supply Line, Food in the
Central Warehouse, and the Cumulative Food
Distributed. As one might expect, there is an early
spike in the Food Supply Line (curve 1), followed by a
reduction as the responders meet the population’s
food needs. The Cumulative Food delivered to the
population (curve 3) levels off as responders meet the
required need; this mirrors the reference mode we
show in Figure 1. However, Figure 9 shows that donors
continue to donate, and the resulting food in the
supply line goes to the Central Warehouse, where it
piles up (curve 2). This, according to observers like
Altay (2008), is a very common scenario following a
disaster.
Figure 10 shows the results of a run similar to
the base run, but where no repair of any infrastructure
occurs, i.e. the roads are only 25% effective for the
entire period. As expected, the Supply Line (curve 1)
never quite empties out, and the Cumulative Food
(curve 3) distributed gets to the population more
slowly--and the response agency never quite meets
the population’s needs (curve 3).
Figure 11 shows the results of a run where the
response agency has zero knowledge of what is in its
Supply Line or its Central Warehouse. The result is
very interesting: the population gets all the food it
needs (curve 3), and the Food Supply Line (curve 1)
does not spike. However, the Food in the Central
Warehouse (curve 2) continues to build, but that is
actually the reason that the first two mentioned stocks
behave so well--because of its ignorance of the
situation, the agency never restocks of its own accord-it is the donors who fill the Supply Line (actually, overfill it). We confirmed this with a run (not shown)
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where all the parameters were the same as this run,
except donations were zero. It was indistinguishable
from the equilibrium run, meaning that, in the
absence of knowledge of its supply line, a disaster
response agency meets the needs of the population
by relying on whatever donations show up.
(Another run not shown indicated that, with 50
percent knowledge of its pipeline, the agency had a
more robust Supply Line and met the needs of the
population a bit more quickly, as one would expect.)
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster,
damage assessors for the response agency might
overestimate the need for food. Figure 12 shows
the results of a run with double the bias for the step
increase in desired food. As one might expect, the
result is that Supply Line (curve 1) spikes a bit early
on, and the agency meets the food needs of the
population (curve 3) a bit earlier. However, the Food
in the Central Warehouse (curve 2) piles up to much
higher levels than needed.
We wanted to assess the effects of a
dampening of the donors’ ardor. Therefore, we
altered, in two ways, the table function that controls
Donation to the Food Supply Line:
1. When the ratio of Donors Desired
Food in the Central Warehouse to the Agency’s
Desired Food in the Central Warehouse was below
one, we eliminated all donation.
2. When that ratio exceeded one, we
reduced the Donation Adjustment from 1.2 to 0.75,
which is a significant dampening of donation.
Figure 13 shows the results, which are dramatic.
There is little change to Food in the Supply Line and
Cumulative Food (curves 1 and 3, respectively), but
the Food in the Central Warehouse (curve 2) is much
lower. In terms of lower costs and less waste, there
are clear benefits to the agency to managing the
ardor of its donors.
Figure 14 shows the results of a run
that did the opposite of the last one--it simulated
what would happen if the agency encouraged donation. We did this by steepening the table function
that controls Donation to the Food Supply Line. Figure 14 shows that the results, compared to the base
run, were modest. This is because the Pressure to Donate that feeds into the table function is at its
highest in the early days after the disaster. As food comes rolling in, the Pressure to Donate drops,
regardless of how steep the table function is.
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To see what would happen were the
agency to cut off donations altogether, we did a
run, which we show in Figure 15, where the
Normal Donation was zero. The results also
were dramatic, with Food in the Central
Warehouse (Curve 2) at much more
manageable levels. However, one subtle effect
was that the population received its needed
food much less quickly, and it did not have its
entire need met by the end of the simulated
period. We conclude that a modest level of
donation is desirable.
Lastly, we did a run that combined two
previous parameter settings: we doubled the
bias and encouraged the donation with a
steeper table function. The results, which we
show in Figure 16, were subtly different from
those we showed in Figure 12. The major
difference was a higher cumulative level of Food
in the Central Warehouse. This came about
because the greater gap at the beginning,
caused by the bias, raised donations early, but
the delivery of food shut them off later.
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6. Discussion and
Recommendations
6.1 Discussion
Of all the stocks in our model of
the Humanitarian Stock Management
System, the most problematic was the
amount of Food in the Central
Warehouse, and the most important was
the Cumulative Food distributed to
disaster victims. Figure 17 shows the
levels of Food in the Central Warehouse
under the various scenarios. Figure 18
shows the results for Cumulative Food
for the same scenarios.
Food in the Central Warehouse is
too high when the agency panics at the
outset and doubles its estimate of
needed food (curves 3 and 8 in Figure
17), although the benefit is that the
agency reaches its Cumulative Food
target more quickly (curves 3 and 8 in
Figure 18). It is too low when donations
are non-existent (curve 7 in Figure 17),
especially when viewed in conjunction
with how long it takes response agencies
to meet the population’s food needs
(curve 7 in Figure 18). However, when
donation is dampened but not shut off,
Food in the Central Warehouse goes to moderate levels (curve 6 in Figure 17) and victims get their food
only slightly more slowly than the base run (curves 6 and 1, respectively, in Figure 18).

6.2 Recommendations
From these figures, we may infer the differential desirability of various policies:
1. It is straightforward that disaster response agencies do all they can to avoid bias in the early
days. Assessments of the Desired Level of Food in the Central Warehouse should be fact-based
and free of panic. The “Double Bias” and “Double Bias and Encouraged Donation” runs clearly
showed the problems with not taking this recommendation--large amounts of wasted food with
little improvement in relief to victims.
2. It is equally straightforward that disaster response agencies and local authorities do all they can
to repair port and road infrastructure as quickly as possible. The “No Repair” run showed less
waste but the worst relief performance.
3. Disaster response agencies should develop good methods for keeping track of what is in their
Central Warehouses and what is in the Supply Line. Failure to do so results in much slower
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Figure 20. Cumulative Food, Optimal Run

distribution of food to victims. It is
interesting that the “No Knowledge”
simulation run showed less waste (lack
of system knowledge encouraged
hyper-conservative ordering), but at
the cost of very slow initial response
(kept going mostly from uncontrolled
donations).
4. Disaster response agencies
should strike a balance between
encouraging and dampening donations.
Having no donations at all would work
well enough, but only if all other
policies worked well. Our simulation
runs showed that, in most simulation
runs, having too many donations
mostly just clogged up the Central
Warehouse. However, managing
donations in a way that started them
only after the initial period, and at a
dampened level, led to less waste with
roughly equivalent relief to victims. Of
the three simulation runs dealing with
donation--“Encourage Donation,”
“Discourage Donation,” and “No
Donation”--only “Discourage Donation”
(in the sense of managing, not
eliminating, it) had good performance
on waste reduction (actually the best
on this measure) and relief (second
only to the “Double Bias” run).

Figures 19 and 20 show the results from an “optimal policies” run that follows all the
recommendations: there is no early bias, authorities repair port and road infrastructures in half their
normal time, responders have perfect knowledge of their supply line and central warehouse inventory,
and they dampen (but do not eliminate) donations. Food in the Central Warehouse is at its lowest level
other than when response agencies cut off donations entirely, and Cumulative Food distributed to
victims is highest (and fastest) other than when there are bias and uncontrolled donations.

16

References
Altay, N. 2008 "Issues in disaster relief logistics." In Large-Scale Disasters: Prediction, Control and
Mitigation. Ed. Gad-el-Hak, M. Cambridge University Press, 120-146. Accessed March 3, 2015 at
http://works.bepress.com/nezih_altay/1
Altay, N. and Labonte, M. 2014 “Challenges in humanitarian information management and exchange:
evidence from Haiti.” Disasters, 38: 50-72.
Besiou, M. and Van Wassenhove, L.N. 2011 “System Dynamics for Humanitarian Operations.” Journal of
Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 1, pp. 78-103.
Cozzolino, A. 2012 “Humanitarian Logistics: Cross-Sector Cooperation in Disaster Relief Management.”
New York: Springer. Chapter 2, “Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management,” pp. 516.
Dean, M.D. and Payne D. 2013, “Disaster management: An ethical review and approach.” International
Journal of Emergency Management, 9, 2, pp. 113-126.
Forrester, J. 1961, Industrial Dynamics. MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.
Forrester, J. 1969, Urban Dynamics. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Forrester, J. and Senge, P. 1980, “Tests for building confidence in system dynamics models,” in Legasto,
A., Forrester, J., and Lyneis, J. (Eds.), System Dynamics: TIMS Studies in the Management
Sciences 14, North-Holland: New York, pp. 209–228.
Goncalves, P. 2008, “System Dynamics Modeling of Humanitarian Relief Operations,” MIT Sloan School
Working Paper, 4704-08.
Holguin-Veras, J., Jaller, M., and Wachtendorf, T. 2012, “Comparative Performance of Alternative
Humanitarian Logistics Structures After the Port-au-Prince Earthquake: ACEs, PIEs, and CANs.”
Transportation Research Part A, 46, pp. 1623-1640.
Homer, J. 1996, “Why we iterate: Scientific modeling in theory and practice,” System Dynamics Review,
12, pp. 1–19.
IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) 2010 “IASC Guidelines on Common Operational Datasets
(CODs) in Disaster Preparedness and Response.” Available at
http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/iasc_guidelines_on_com
mon_operational_datasets_in_disaster_preparedness_and_response_2010-11-01.pdf
Kovács, G. and Spens K.M., 2007,"Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations," International
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 37(2): 99-114.

17

Morecroft, J. 1985, “Rationality in the analysis of behavioral simulation models,” Management Science,
31, pp. 900–916.
OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 2010 “Financial Tracking
Service Haiti Report December 2010.” Available at
http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10c_C91_Y2010_asof___1312180300.pdf
OCHA 2015 “Cluster Coordination.” Accessed February 26, 2015 at http://www.unocha.org/what-wedo/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination
Randers, J. (Ed.) 1980, Elements of the System Dynamics Method. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Richardson, G. 1991, Feedback Thought in Social Science and Systems Theory, University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, PA.
Richmond, B. 1993 “Systems thinking: critical thinking skills for the 1990s and beyond.” System
Dynamics Review, 9(2), pp. 113-133.
Senge, P. 1990, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, New York:
Doubleday/Currency.
Sterman, J. 2000, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World,
Irwin/McGraw-Hill: Boston.
Sterman, J. 2001, “System dynamics modeling: Tools for learning in a complex world.” California
Management Review, 43, pp. 8–25.
System Dynamics Society, 2014, “Introduction to System Dynamics.”
http://www.systemdynamics.org/what-is-s/ Accessed April 14, 2014.
Taylor, G., Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., Haver, K., Harvey, P., Barber, K., Schreter, L., and Wilhelm, C. 2012
“The State of the Humanitarian System.” London: ALNAP. Accessed March 3, 2015 at
http://www.alnap.org/what-we-do/effectiveness/sohs
World Food Programme, 2013 WFP Logistics, Transforming Logistics: Progress Made in 2013. Accessed
March 3, 2015 at
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp267579.pdf

18

